- Russian analyst Vladimir Khrustalev proposed leasing North Korean Su-25 aircraft for use in the Ukraine war, citing weapons configurations shown during North Korean military celebrations.
- The proposal follows battlefield experience showing Russia’s Su-25SM3 modernization cannot employ precision weapons effectively or operate against dense air defenses.
A Russian defense analyst has publicly proposed leasing North Korean Su-25 ground-attack aircraft for use in the war in Ukraine, citing the weapons configuration displayed on the aircraft during a recent North Korean military event.
The proposal was outlined by Vladimir Khrustalev, a Russian expert on North Korea’s military-industrial complex and nuclear weapons, following celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of the North Korean Air Force. During the event, North Korea showcased Su-25 attack aircraft carrying weapons that Khrustalev described as having longer range and higher accuracy than unguided rocket pods typically used in lofted attack profiles.
According to Khrustalev, the displayed weapons would allow strikes against targets along the line of contact and deeper inside opposing formations while reducing exposure to air defense systems. He wrote that such a configuration increases the likelihood of disabling targets while limiting risk to the aircraft.
Khrustalev argued that leasing the aircraft to Russia for combat use would be a practical option, noting that leasing combat aircraft and temporarily assigning foreign pilots to another country’s air force is an established practice with defined compensation and insurance mechanisms.
He said North Korea would face limited risk under such an arrangement, as the use of precision-guided weapons outside the effective range of air defenses would reduce pilot exposure. In return, Pyongyang would receive financial compensation, combat experience, pilot flight hours, and overhauls of aircraft airframes. Khrustalev added that if aircraft were lost, Russia could compensate by transferring refurbished Su-25 aircraft from its own inventory.
From Russia’s perspective, Khrustalev said additional Su-25 aircraft would supplement existing numbers and allow the use of precision-guided munitions instead of unguided rockets. He argued this would increase the number of targets struck per day while improving efficiency in fuel use, basing capacity, and spare parts logistics.
In his analysis, Khrustalev referenced what he described as a new cruise missile compatible with the Su-25, stating that two such missiles could be carried per aircraft. He estimated the missile’s range at 100–150 kilometers, with more optimistic estimates reaching 250–300 kilometers. He also pointed to smaller guided missiles resembling Iran’s Ghaem-114, which he said could have a guided flight range of at least 10 kilometers.
Khrustalev wrote that laser-guided weapons could be employed using unmanned aerial vehicles as target designators, drawing comparisons to the use of Krasnopol laser-guided artillery shells. He noted that cross-platform laser designation has been used by NATO air forces since the 1980s and in combat since 1991.
He further claimed that Iran has developed more advanced variants of the Ghaem-114 family with “fire-and-forget” guidance and suggested North Korea could possess similar systems due to decades-long cooperation between Pyongyang and Tehran in sensitive military fields.
The expert also argued that Russian guidance kits for unguided bombs could be adapted for North Korean Su-25 aircraft, allowing the use of glide bombs equipped with guidance modules. He said this would enable the employment of guided FAB-500-class munitions rather than traditional rocket attacks.
The proposal also comes amid ongoing questions inside Russia about the effectiveness of its own Su-25SM3 modernization program.
Combat experience in Ukraine has shown that the Su-25SM3 is not designed to employ precision-guided weapons and cannot be used effectively in environments with dense and modern air defense coverage. The war has also demonstrated that further modernization through incremental avionics upgrades is not feasible under current operational and industrial conditions, limiting the aircraft’s adaptability to contemporary battlefield requirements.

