- Askari Defense was selected as a semifinalist in the U.S. Army's xTech|Adaptive Strike competition and will participate in a Soldier Exercise at the National Training Center.
- The company's Rift Alpha interceptor targets Group 1 and Group 2 drones, with a 2-kilometer range and fire-and-forget autonomous operation after hand, ground, or box launch.
Askari Defense has been selected as a semifinalist in the U.S. Army’s xTech|Adaptive Strike competition, and the Atlanta-based company is heading to the National Training Center to put its Rift Alpha interceptor drone through its paces alongside the soldiers it was designed to protect.
The selection marks a concrete step forward for a small firm that has built its pitch around a deceptively simple proposition: give dismounted infantry a fast, intuitive tool to shoot down the small drones that have turned modern battlefields into surveillance gauntlets.
The xTech|Adaptive Strike competition, run with the involvement of the U.S. Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology — ASA(ALT) — places semifinalists in a Soldier Exercise at the National Training Center, one of the Army’s premier combat training environments. The National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, runs some of the most demanding and realistic force-on-force exercises in the American military, and putting a counter-UAS interceptor through that environment alongside actual operators is a fundamentally different test than a controlled range demonstration. If Rift Alpha works there, it works under conditions that approximate what soldiers actually face.
Rift Alpha is a hand-launched interceptor built to engage Group 1 and Group 2 unmanned aerial systems — the category of small drones, typically weighing under 55 pounds, that have proliferated across virtually every modern conflict zone. These are the reconnaissance quadcopters, the commercial-off-the-shelf platforms modified to drop grenades, the low-altitude loitering threats that infantry units increasingly encounter without any organic means to defeat them. Rift Alpha’s stated engagement range is 2 kilometers. Once launched — by hand, from the ground, or from a box-based launcher — it operates autonomously, using a fire-and-forget approach that removes the operator from the guidance loop after launch. In a fast-moving engagement where multiple small UAS threats might appear simultaneously, that autonomy isn’t a luxury.
A hand-launched interceptor that can also fire from a ground-based or box-mounted system gives small units genuine versatility. A four-man team on a dismounted patrol can carry the interceptor and deploy it on the move. A fixed observation post can run the same system from a launcher, maintaining ready-to-fire posture without dedicating a soldier to the task full-time. That range of employment options is exactly what the Army has been asking for as it grapples with how to distribute counter-UAS capability down to the squad and platoon level, rather than concentrating it in dedicated air defense units that may not be present when the threat arrives.
Askari has framed its development philosophy with deliberate clarity: the focus is “not on complexity, but on capability that delivers when it counts.” That framing is a direct response to one of the recurring failure modes in defense procurement — systems that are technically impressive but too complicated for soldiers to operate effectively under stress, with degraded communications, in darkness, or with minimal training time. Rift Alpha’s design emphasis on quick employment and intuitive operation suggests the company has studied how counter-UAS systems have actually performed in combat, not just on the demonstration range.
The small UAS threat that Rift Alpha targets has not waited for the acquisition system to catch up. Across Ukraine, the Middle East, and multiple other conflict zones, Group 1 and Group 2 drones have demonstrated an ability to find, track, fix, and strike ground forces with a regularity and precision that would have seemed improbable a decade ago. The platforms are cheap, commercially available, and increasingly capable. Defeating them with expensive interceptor missiles or complex electronic warfare systems is neither economically sustainable nor practically achievable at the scale the threat now demands. What the infantry needs is something a soldier can carry, launch without a checklist, and trust to find the target on its own.

