As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, Russia has sharply increased the production of its newest T-90M main battle tanks, with estimates suggesting an annual output potentially reaching 280–300 units in 2024.
Drawing upon a new report from the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), a group of open-source investigators says that the expansion comes amid the near-exhaustion of Russia’s usable tank reserves and an ongoing effort to sustain long-term combat operations.
By the time full-scale production of the T-90M Proryv began in 2020, Russia had already fielded between 120 and 150 original T-90s and around 280 T-90A variants. Serial deliveries of the modernized T-90M began shortly before the invasion of Ukraine, with at least 66 to 85 units deployed to front-line formations by February 2022. An additional ten tanks were assigned to the Kazan Higher Tank Command School.
CIT estimates that in 2022, Uralvagonzavod—the state-owned plant in Nizhny Tagil—produced 60–70 T-90M tanks. In 2023, production surged to an estimated 140–180 units, and in 2024, may have exceeded 200 units, possibly approaching 300. This includes both newly built and modernized tanks. The company has reportedly expanded its operations to a 24-hour production cycle, issued tenders for new welding and machining stations, and is pursuing further technical upgrades to support future growth.
“The availability of new armored hulls does not appear to be a limiting factor,” CIT said. “All T-90M tanks currently being produced are newly built.”
According to CIT, Russia has produced at least 540–630 T-90M tanks since the start of the invasion. With over 130 visually confirmed destroyed, damaged, or captured, the remaining fleet in active service is estimated at 410–500 tanks—roughly 15% of the total Russian tank force.
The report also pushes back on earlier Western assessments suggesting lower output levels. While estimates published in outlets like The Economist put T-90M production at 28–30 tanks annually, CIT argues these figures are based on outdated assumptions and an overreliance on publicly released delivery announcements.
“The actual production rate is significantly higher,” CIT stated, citing visual evidence of larger trainloads of tanks, consistent sightings of T-90M units across multiple fronts, and data from Russia’s own defense procurement infrastructure.
The research notes that earlier production relied heavily on modernizing T-90A tanks, but as those stocks have been exhausted, Uralvagonzavod has shifted primarily to manufacturing tanks from scratch. Despite difficulties in sourcing high-tech components, such as advanced fire control systems, T-90M tanks have continued to roll off the lines with key capabilities intact.
Still, production remains insufficient to replace all battlefield losses. According to CIT and other OSINT analysts, Russia has lost more than 3,000 tanks since 2022, including 1,050–1,100 in 2024 alone. While tank losses are projected to decline in 2025, maintaining a stable armored force will depend heavily on continued production.
Efforts are also underway to expand tank assembly capabilities. CIT identified multiple tenders issued by Uralvagonzavod for structural upgrades and new equipment installations, including round-the-clock welding stations. The work is scheduled for completion between 2024 and 2025.
While these upgrades may allow Russia to sustain current production levels, any further expansion would require large-scale investment and access to modern equipment. CIT argues that enforcing tighter export controls and sanctions is critical to constraining Russia’s ability to scale up further.
“Limiting Russia’s military production must become a cornerstone of NATO’s deterrence strategy in Europe,” CIT concluded. “Targeted restrictions on equipment and enforcement of secondary sanctions remain essential to slowing the growth of Russia’s defense capacity.”
CIT estimates that if current trends continue and combat operations were to cease, Russia could produce nearly 1,000 new tanks within three years, and up to 3,000 within a decade—posing long-term risks for regional stability and future military confrontations.