The U.S. Department of Defense has ordered the cancellation of the M10 Booker light tank program.
The decision comes as part of a broader overhaul outlined in a newly released Pentagon memorandum titled Army Transformation and Acquisition Reform, signed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth on May 1.
The memo directs the Army to terminate procurement of several platforms, including the M10 Booker, once hailed as a key solution for mobile protected firepower in infantry brigade combat teams.
The combat vehicle, developed by General Dynamics Land Systems, has come under scrutiny for logistical and operational shortcomings that rendered it unsuitable for its intended role.
“The Booker is a classic example of sunk cost fallacy and the Army doing something wrong,” Army Secretary Dan Driscoll told reporters at a roundtable at the Pentagon.
The cancellation follows reporting by Defense One, which revealed that Fort Campbell—home to the 101st Airborne Division—could not support the M10’s weight. Of the post’s 11 bridges, eight were deemed structurally unfit to handle the 42-ton vehicle. Originally conceived under the Mobile Protected Firepower (MPF) program, the M10 was intended to be air-transportable. However, it can no longer meet its original airlift goals, as only one can now be carried per C-17 aircraft, matching the logistical burden of an M1A2 Abrams.
“This is not a story of acquisition gone awry,” Alex Miller, the Army’s chief technology officer, told Defense One. “This is a story of the requirements process creating so much inertia that the Army couldn’t get out of its own way, and it just kept rolling and rolling and rolling.”
Miller pointed out that the collapse began when the Army canceled the air-drop requirement in 2015, undermining the tank’s core mobility advantage.
The Army had planned to field 504 M10s, with 12 prototypes and 96 low-rate production vehicles already completed or in production. The second and third production batches were scheduled for delivery in FY2025. However, with the program’s cancellation, those vehicles now face an uncertain future—potentially being transferred to armored units, sold abroad, or placed in storage.
The M10 program’s failure highlights the risks of rapid acquisition in the absence of infrastructure compatibility and evolving mission clarity. As the Army recalibrates its vehicle portfolio, attention is likely to shift toward more flexible and infrastructure-aware solutions.