Taiwan has accelerated the modernization of its armed forces to bolster deterrence against China.
Defense spending has steadily risen under the Democratic Progressive Party government – reaching an expected US $20.25 billion in 2025 (2.45% of GDP). Key programs emphasize both foreign arms acquisitions and indigenous weapons development.
Taipei continues to upgrade and expand its fleet of F-16 fighter jets, converting 141 older F-16A/Bs to the advanced F-16V variant and ordering 66 new F-16Vs with improved avionics and radars to counter China’s J-20 stealth fighters. In 2024, the military budget included an extra NT$94.3 billion (~$3 billion) special procurement, about half earmarked for new fighter aircraft and the rest for naval defenses. This was reinforced by U.S. arms sales, such as advanced infrared search-and-track systems for Taiwan’s F-16s (the same sensors used on U.S. F-35s) to help detect stealth aircraft and deter Chinese air incursions.
Taiwan’s domestic defense industry is also ramping up. In September 2023, Taiwan unveiled its first indigenously built diesel-electric submarine, named Hai Kun (Narwhal), as a milestone in a program to field eight new submarines by the late 2020s. Initiated by President Tsai Ing-wen in 2016, the indigenous submarine project aims to strengthen Taiwan’s asymmetric naval capabilities against the PLA Navy, with the first boat expected to enter service by 2025 after sea trials. Likewise, the state-owned NCSIST (National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology) has dramatically expanded missile production. A special NT$209 billion (US $7.4 billion) defense budget (2022–2026) was devoted largely to indigenous missiles, enabling Taiwan to mass-produce over 1,000 missiles per year by 2023 – two years ahead of schedule. This includes new long-range land-attack cruise missiles (like the Hsiung Sheng), anti-ship missiles (Hsiung Feng series), and loitering munitions, giving Taiwan greater ability to threaten invading forces and strike targets across the Taiwan Strait. In March 2023, the Ministry of Defense showcased a lineup of domestically developed combat drones and loitering munitions, highlighting a focus on unmanned systems for surveillance and precision strike. These efforts reflect an “army of porcupines” approach – deploying large numbers of mobile, hard-to-detect systems (missiles, mines, drones) that can inflict serious damage on a larger foe.
Despite heavy investments, Taiwan’s military procurement process has faced challenges, including bureaucratic inefficiencies and past corruption scandals. To address this, leaders in Taipei call for reforms in defense acquisition to streamline delivery of critical arms. Overall, however, the 2023–2025 period has seen Taiwan steadily improve its firepower and resilience through a combination of upgraded hardware from abroad and an energized domestic defense sector. The clear objective is to make the island a “porcupine” – bristling with enough advanced weaponry that any invasion would be daunting and costly for Beijing.
Taiwan’s military strategy has undergone notable shifts to confront the growing threat of a Chinese attack. The armed forces are embracing an asymmetric warfare doctrine known as the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), which emphasizes “deterrence by denial.” First articulated by former Chief of General Staff Adm. Lee Hsi-ming, the ODC calls for a focus on small, mobile, and lethal platforms rather than expensive large assets. In practice, this means prioritizing systems like missile launchers, fast-attack craft, mines, and drones that can survive a first strike and inflict “mission kills” on invading forces, rather than seeking outright destruction through head-on attrition. Taiwan aims to deny the PLA air and sea control in the Taiwan Strait’s littoral zone, turning the coastal areas into a deadly choke point for any amphibious assault. This “porcupine strategy” is designed to raise the costs of aggression – making any invasion slow, painful, and likely to fail.
In line with this doctrine, training and force structure have been adjusted. The military is improving its joint readiness and reserve mobilization to ensure a rapid response. Lessons from Ukraine’s defense have prompted Taiwan to harden its resilience – dispersing aircraft, fortifying bases, and practicing operating under sustained missile barrages. Recognizing that the opening phase of a conflict would be intense, Taiwan began overhauling its reserve forces training in 2022. Under a new system, select reservists undergo 14 days of intensive combat refresher training (up from just 5–7 days previously) with a heavy focus on live-fire exercises. By giving reservists more realistic shooting and field drills, Taipei seeks to ensure a credible backup force that can augment active-duty units in an emergency. Regular “Han Kuang” exercises (Taiwan’s annual war games) now integrate scenarios like defending beaches, repairing runways, and restoring communications after cyberattacks – all reflecting a shift toward total defense of the homeland.
Taiwan’s leaders have also reorganized the military’s structure to enhance readiness. President Tsai announced an “all-out defense” force realignment, creating a standing “garrison” force of conscripts dedicated to territorial defense and infrastructure protection, while active volunteer units form a rapid reaction frontline force. The garrison units – regularly trained and stationed locally – would allow a faster response to incursions or sabotage, rather than waiting to call up reserves. Meanwhile, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has increasingly highlighted preparations for “gray-zone” incursions short of invasion – such as Chinese naval blockades or airspace violations – and devised protocols to respond firmly but avoid accidental escalation.
Overall, Taiwan’s doctrine by 2025 centers on “defense in depth”: blunt the initial onslaught, keep the enemy from gaining a foothold, and buy time for international aid. By making any attempt at forced unification extremely uncertain and costly for Beijing, Taiwan hopes to deter conflict altogether. As President Tsai has put it, “Only by preparing for war can we avoid it – only by being capable of fighting a war can we stop one.” This mindset underpins the strategic and operational changes underway in Taiwan’s defense establishment.
Taiwan’s government has introduced multiple domestic initiatives to strengthen the island’s sovereignty, societal resilience, and will to fight. A landmark step was the extension of compulsory military service from 4 months to 1 year, reversing an earlier downsizing of the conscript system. President Tsai Ing-wen announced this policy in December 2022, citing China’s rising military threat and the need for greater preparedness. The new one-year conscription program officially began in January 2024 as the first batch of draftees reported for duty. This move, while politically sensitive, enjoyed cross-party and public support given increased concern over China. It will gradually boost active troop numbers and the trained reserve pool, as each year’s cohort of young men undergo more robust combat training before entering the reserves. The Defense Ministry noted that longer service will “enhance immediate combat effectiveness…improve the quality of reserve personnel, strengthen mobilization energy, and enhance overall national defense”. Alongside this, the government raised conscript pay and updated training curricula (e.g. adding Stinger anti-air missile and Javelin anti-tank weapon modules) to improve morale and combat-readiness of draftees.
Another major initiative has been elevating civilian and whole-of-society involvement in defense. In 2024, President Lai Ching-te (Tsai’s successor) convened the first meeting of the “Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee.” This high-level body is developing plans to integrate civilian capabilities into national defense – most notably a program to train 400,000 civilian reservists for support roles in wartime. The idea is to harness existing volunteer networks (volunteer police, firefighters, civil defense teams, etc.) and give them basic training to assist the military “when necessary” under the principle of a “shared fate”. These trained civilian auxiliaries could help with logistics, medical care, firefighting, engineering repairs, or even use their vehicles and equipment to support military operations. Such planning reflects Taipei’s resolve to ensure the continuity of governance and society during a conflict – a recognition that modern war would target not just the frontline military, but also the civilian infrastructure and population’s will.
Politically, the ruling administration has also pushed legal and organizational reforms to bolster national security. Taiwan passed a new Anti-Infiltration Act (effective 2020) to crack down on Chinese political interference and influence operations. During 2023–2024, officials debated amendments to the All-out Defense Mobilization Act to clarify emergency powers and coordination mechanisms for wartime, although some provisions (related to media control) faced public scrutiny for potential overreach. Notably, in early 2024 the Ministry of National Defense was for the first time in years led by a civilian minister (Wellington Koo), appointed by President-elect Lai. This break from tradition signaled a commitment to reforming the defense establishment, bridging the civilian-military gap, and injecting fresh perspectives into defense policymaking. Koo and other civilian officials have emphasized transparency, anti-corruption in arms procurement, and closer collaboration with civic institutions on defense matters.
In terms of sovereignty, Taiwan’s leaders have been unwavering that the island’s future must be decided by its 23 million people, not by Beijing. While avoiding any formal declaration of independence (to prevent a trigger for war), President Tsai and President Lai have consistently asserted Taiwan’s democratic identity and rejected China’s “one country, two systems” model. They have sought to strengthen international partnerships (informally, given lack of UN membership) and secure diplomatic support for Taiwan’s de facto independence, which bolsters morale at home. Domestic messaging from the government also stresses unity and resilience, with campaigns to inform the public about the China threat and the importance of national defense. In short, through compulsory service reform, engaging civilians in defense, safeguarding democracy from interference, and solidifying national identity, Taiwan’s political leadership is fortifying the island’s “spiritual defense” as well as its physical one.
Preparing the civilian population for crisis has become a priority in Taiwan, especially after witnessing Ukraine’s experience. The government has revived and expanded civil defense training, infrastructure, and public education to ensure that if war comes, society can continue to function and support the fight. Taiwan maintains an extensive network of air-raid shelters dating back to the Cold War; as of 2022, there were around 105,000 shelter locations nationwide, with capacity to house tens of millions of people in an emergency. Maps and mobile apps (provided by police and local authorities) are available to help citizens find the nearest shelter, including basements, parking garages, and metro stations designated for protection during missile strikes. Annual civil defense drills known as “Wan An” air raid exercises are conducted in each region (usually alongside the Han Kuang military exercise). During these drills, sirens howl and civilians practice taking cover — traffic halts, and authorities rehearse evacuating people into shelters for 30 minutes to simulate an incoming attack. Such drills have been expanded in 2023 to be more “unscripted,” better simulating the chaos of a real Chinese assault on cities.
Beyond passive sheltering, Taiwan is pushing active civil preparedness training. Multiple NGOs and private initiatives have blossomed to teach civilians useful skills. For example, the Kuma Academy (“Black Bear Academy”) and Forward Alliance offer courses in first aid, search and rescue, firefighting, and even basic marksmanship for volunteers. Enrollment in these programs surged after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, reflecting public awareness that in war, every citizen may need to pitch in. The government has quietly supported such efforts, even as Beijing has threatened to sanction their organizers. By late 2024, Taiwan’s civil defense organizations held high-profile events like a 9-day “Stand Up for Taiwan” national defense relay march to raise awareness and unity.
Taiwan’s interior ministry also oversees a formal Civil Defense Corps, which in peacetime focuses on disaster response (typhoons, earthquakes) but in wartime would shift to support military needs. Plans are in place to integrate emergency services with defense: hospital and EMS networks have contingency plans for mass casualty incidents; utility companies have protocols to quickly repair power and water outages caused by bombardment; and telecom providers are hardening communications infrastructure. In 2023, the government distributed an updated Civil Defense Handbook (both online and in print) giving citizens practical guidance on preparing emergency kits, locating shelters, and distinguishing air raid sirens. Public-service campaigns encourage stocking of food, water, and medical supplies at home sufficient for at least 72 hours of self-sustenance during a crisis.
While these efforts are still evolving, defense analysts note that Taiwan’s civil defense, though improved, is not yet at the level of countries like Israel or Switzerland. Calls have been made for even more comprehensive training – for instance, mandatory civil defense instruction in schools and community-based drills beyond the annual Wan An exercise. Nonetheless, by 2025 Taiwan has clearly moved to better prepare its populace mentally and physically for potential conflict. The underlying philosophy is that “national defense depends on the people” – an engaged civilian population can provide vital depth to Taiwan’s defenses by keeping the society resilient under attack and freeing up the military to focus on the front lines.
Defense analysts generally assess that an all-out Chinese invasion of Taiwan, while the gravest threat, is not imminent as of 2025, though the risk is growing. China’s military buildup has been rapid – the PLA Navy now fields the largest fleet in Asia (potentially 395 warships by end of 2025, including new carriers and amphibious assault ships) and the PLA Air Force has introduced stealth fighters and a massive missile arsenal. Beijing has also intensified joint invasion drills around Taiwan: in 2024, after Taiwan’s presidential inauguration, the PLA conducted large-scale exercises encircling the island in mere days, simulating blockades and strikes. These activities demonstrate increasing capability to seal off Taiwan and deter foreign intervention. However, most experts believe Beijing still harbors doubts about launching a full-scale attack. The Pentagon notes the PLA has not yet proven it can execute the complex amphibious operations, urban fighting, and long supply lines that a Taiwan invasion would require. China also lacks real combat experience (having not fought a war since 1979), and its officer corps may be untested in handling the chaos of high-intensity conflict. Internal issues – from economic pressures to an aging population – further weigh on Chinese decision-makers. As one analysis from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in early 2025 concluded, “despite…rapid improvements, it’s unlikely [China] will use large-scale force against Taiwan in 2025”, absent an extreme provocation.
Instead of an immediate invasion, analysts widely anticipate other military coercion scenarios. A common view is that Beijing might attempt a form of blockade or “quarantine” of Taiwan as a precursor or alternative to outright invasion. For example, China could use its coast guard and maritime militia to impede shipping to Taiwan, selectively stopping and inspecting vessels under the pretext of enforcement, thereby strangling the island’s economy and pressuring Taipei to capitulate. Such a limited blockade would be ambiguous – not a clear act of war – making it harder for the U.S. or others to decide when to intervene. If sustained, a quarantine could undermine public confidence in the Taiwan government and sow panic without the risks of a D-Day style invasion. Taiwanese and U.S. experts have been wargaming these scenarios, and surveys find skepticism that allies would militarily break a Chinese blockade immediately. This places even greater onus on Taiwan to plan for continuity under siege – keeping supply lines open where possible, rationing critical goods, and countering coercion through international diplomatic channels.
Should a full-scale war erupt, virtually all studies agree it would be devastating for all sides. A high-profile wargame by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) ran 24 invasion scenarios: in the majority, Taiwan (with U.S. and Japanese help) repelled the PLA invasion and remained de facto autonomous, but the losses were staggering. Taiwan’s military was severely degraded and its economy devastated in every scenario, while U.S. forces lost dozens of ships and thousands of personnel, and China’s navy and air force took enormous attrition – threatening the stability of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule if it failed to conquer Taiwan. Some simulations saw the conflict quickly escalate beyond Taiwan, with China attacking U.S. bases in the Pacific and even flirting with limited nuclear strikes – outcomes so dire that strategists question if invading Taiwan is Beijing’s rational choice at all. As a recent Stimson Center report pointed out, China currently has only a fraction of the amphibious lift required for a successful Normandy-style landing. Analysts suggest Beijing’s “best strategy” might instead be a mix of subversion, psychological warfare, and tailored strikes to force Taiwan’s surrender without a ruinous war.
From Taiwan’s perspective, these expert insights reinforce the importance of its 2023–2025 preparations. The consensus is that while a frontal invasion is possible but not likely in the immediate term, the threat of war cannot be discounted – especially with Chinese President Xi Jinping ordering the PLA to be ready for a Taiwan option by 2027. Thus, Taiwan must remain vigilant against lower-level aggression (incursions, cyber attacks, blockades) that could escalate. In public, Taiwanese officials stress that they seek peace and status quo, but will fight if attacked. They also quietly prepare for worst-case scenarios by drilling mobilization plans and coordinating with potential partners (without overtly involving them in public discussions, so as not to provoke China).
In sum, defense analysts view a Taiwan conflict as a highly dangerous gambit for China, but one that cannot be ruled out. Taiwan’s military and civil readiness between 2023 and 2025 aims to raise the threshold for aggression, improve the island’s odds of endurance, and signal to Beijing that any resort to force would be a disastrous last resort. As the saying in Taipei goes, “The more prepared we are, the less likely we’ll have to fight.”