Russian new ICBM finally succeeds — after years of failure

Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces conducted their second successful test launch of the RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile on May 12, 2026, firing the weapon from a silo at Dombarovsky near Yasny in the Orenburg region and announcing the result publicly through the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The test is Russia’s first publicly acknowledged Sarmat success since the missile’s inaugural flight in 2022, and it follows two previous test failures that Moscow never admitted to. According to IISS analysis, Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a briefing connected to the test, claimed the missile has a range of “over 35,000 kilometers” and can fly a “suborbital” trajectory, language that describes the weapon’s intended ability to approach the United States from the south rather than the north, bypassing radar systems oriented to detect launches over the Arctic.

The RS-28 Sarmat, designated RS-SS-X-29 in NATO’s reporting system, is a three-stage liquid-propelled ICBM designed to replace the RS-20V Voevoda, a Cold War-era missile that NATO calls the SS-18 Satan. The Voevoda first entered service in 1988 and has been extended and kept operational well past its original design life through successive life-extension programs. More than one-third of Russia’s deployed land-based nuclear warheads currently ride on these aging boosters, making the replacement program a direct necessity rather than a modernization preference. Sarmat carries an estimated 10 to 15 multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, meaning a single launch can deliver up to 15 separate nuclear warheads aimed at different targets. Russia also plans to arm the missile with the Avangard hypersonic boost-glide vehicle, a warhead that can maneuver at hypersonic speeds in the upper atmosphere, significantly complicating any missile defense system’s ability to intercept it.

The southern approach trajectory Putin described is not mere boasting, it is a genuine strategic complication. The United States has invested heavily in missile defense radar infrastructure oriented toward the Arctic, the traditional flight path for Russian ICBMs targeting American cities. A missile that flies south from Russia, crosses Antarctica, and approaches the continental United States from below the equator reaches its targets from a direction that existing early warning radars were not designed to cover. The physics of a depressed or near-polar southward trajectory also allow the missile to remain below the radar horizon for a longer portion of its flight, further compressing the warning time available to American commanders. Whether this trajectory is operationally reliable at intercontinental range is a technical question the Sarmat’s development history has not yet fully answered, but the intent is unambiguous.

The missile was originally scheduled for deployment between 2018 and 2020. It missed that window entirely. The first known flight test attempt, in September 2024, ended when the missile exploded in its own silo, a catastrophic failure that destroyed the launch facility and was not publicly acknowledged by the Kremlin. The second attempt, in November 2025, failed during the boost phase, again without public admission from Moscow. The May 12 test is therefore only the second successful launch in the program’s entire history, not a milestone in a smooth development curve but a relief after a string of humiliations, according to the IISS analysis. The fact that NOTAM analysis suggests the test may have been postponed at least twice, with preparation apparently beginning in March and warning notices issued over the test range in mid-April and late April, indicates the launch attempt was not executed with confidence on the first attempt.

U.S. Air Force RC-135S Cobra Ball aircraft, a specialized variant of the Rivet Joint family configured specifically to collect telemetry intelligence on ballistic missile tests, were active off the coast of Alaska ahead of the May 12 launch attempt. The Cobra Ball’s mission is to gather data on the missile’s performance characteristics as it flies downrange, giving U.S. analysts an independent assessment of what actually happened. Whatever the Cobra Ball collected during the May 12 test has not been released publicly, but the aircraft’s presence confirms the United States was monitoring the launch in real time.

RVSN Commander Colonel General Sergey Karakayev told Putin that the test “paved the way” for Sarmat to be placed on combat duty with the first regiment at the 62nd Missile Division at Uzhur near Krasnoyarsk later in 2026, according to the IISS analysis. The 302nd Missile Regiment is expected to be the first unit to receive the weapon, and upgrades to its six silos began in 2021. Satellite imagery as of mid-2026 shows the final two silo upgrades nearing completion, with new command posts, double fencing, and hardened surfaces visible around the launch facilities. Sarmat is eventually planned for deployment with two divisions.

The IISS analysis frames the deployment picture with candor: two successful flight tests against several failures is “shaky ground” even for what Russia calls “experimental combat service.” The comparison to the RS-24 Yars, a newer Russian ICBM that completed three successful tests and was delivered to regiments in 2010 before achieving full combat status in 2011, is pointed. Russia is moving Sarmat toward operational deployment faster than its test record would normally justify. The IISS assessment attributes this to the unavoidable reality of the Voevoda’s age: Moscow may simply have no choice but to accept more risk in fielding Sarmat than it would prefer, because there is no other ICBM program that could substitute if Sarmat fails, and because the Voevoda’s further life extensions are becoming increasingly difficult to guarantee.

Russia’s nuclear modernization program has always rested heavily on Sarmat as the replacement for its heaviest land-based missiles. A missile that has failed more often than it has succeeded, that was years behind schedule before its first successful test, and that is now being pushed toward operational deployment under conditions that would not pass muster in a more straightforward development program is a known quantity for American strategic planners. It is also, as of May 12, 2026, a missile that successfully flew downrange and landed at its intended test range. That distinction matters. The program is not dead, and Russia is moving forward. Whether Sarmat proves reliable enough to form the cornerstone of Russian nuclear deterrence for the next several decades, as it is intended to, is a question that only continued testing and operational experience can answer.