- Middle East analyst Anatolii Maksymov says Iran’s asymmetric warfare strategy targeting shipping routes, energy infrastructure, and Gulf security vulnerabilities is placing pressure on the United States and its regional coalition.
- Maksymov argues that attacks on ports, tankers, and the Strait of Hormuz are intended to disrupt global energy flows and weaken coalition unity by raising economic costs and regional security concerns.
Anatolii Maksymov, an expert at the Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Centre and Middle East analyst, said Iran’s asymmetric military strategy is placing growing pressure on the United States and its regional partners as the conflict spreads across the Persian Gulf and surrounding energy infrastructure.
In a published analysis of the ongoing confrontation, Maksymov argues that while the United States may achieve tactical successes on the battlefield, Tehran is pursuing a broader strategy aimed at weakening coalition unity and exploiting vulnerabilities in regional defense systems.
“The United States may be winning on the battlefield, but strategically Iran is winning. Tehran’s asymmetric strategy strikes several precisely defined pressure points that the United States entered the war with only a crudely drawn plan to address,” Maksymov said.
The assessment comes as attacks linked to Iran or its regional proxies increasingly target maritime traffic, oil infrastructure, and Gulf energy facilities, threatening a region responsible for a large share of global energy exports.
Maksymov said U.S. planners initially approached the conflict under assumptions shaped by earlier military campaigns in Iraq and Libya.
“The United States thought Iran was another Iraq or Libya. Cut off the head of the hydra and everything collapses. But in place of one head ten more appeared, and behind them more still; the hydra remains alive, the regime closed ranks, and the bayonets of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps brought an even more aggressive leader to power,” he said.
According to the analyst, Iran’s military posture reflects years of preparation for a conflict with a technologically superior adversary. Rather than relying solely on ballistic missile strikes, Tehran has developed a layered approach that combines drones, naval sabotage operations, and attacks on energy infrastructure.
“The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps meanwhile probed the defenses of Gulf countries — and not only them — with missiles before turning to more dangerous means of warfare. When ballistic missiles were suppressed, Iran was ready. Drones, the blocking of Hormuz, maritime and energy terror. UAVs, boats, mines,” Maksymov said.
The Strait of Hormuz, a narrow maritime corridor linking the Persian Gulf to global shipping lanes, carries roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and petroleum traffic. Any disruption to that passage has immediate effects on global energy markets and maritime trade.
Maksymov argues that attacks against energy terminals, ports, and commercial shipping were designed to generate economic shock rather than purely military outcomes.
“Then came the turn of ports, tankers, gas and oil terminals — the black blood of the region. Every day there were reports and photos of burning tanks even in Oman. The Strait of Hormuz closed, plunging markets and 20 percent of the world’s goods and oil traffic into chaos,” he said.
He added that the strategy aims to create pressure on the political cohesion of the U.S.-led coalition operating in the region.
“This was a strike against coalition unity, calculated on the assumption that even a couple of weeks of such shock would force the world to demand the end of the operation because of rising prices and supply delays to Asia. Iran can sustain this for a long time, unlike its opponent,” Maksymov said.
The analysis also highlights growing concerns among Gulf monarchies about the vulnerability of critical infrastructure and the adequacy of existing defense arrangements with Washington.
“When skyscrapers in the Emirates and Bahrain began to burn, the region shuddered — the illusion of total security was destroyed at little cost. The monarchies began asking one another: why the hell didn’t the United States do more for our defense, and now we have to defend them on our own land?” Maksymov said.
Iran’s strategy relies on systems that are inexpensive compared with traditional state arsenals. Armed drones, fast attack boats, naval mines, and sabotage teams allow Tehran to challenge larger naval forces and threaten commercial shipping routes without relying on large conventional formations.
Defense analysts have long warned that such asymmetric approaches can complicate conventional military responses because they disperse threats across multiple domains — maritime, economic, and civilian infrastructure — rather than concentrating them on a battlefield.
Maksymov also questioned whether several options discussed in Washington could realistically change the strategic balance in the short term.
“A commando raid for Iranian uranium? That needed to be done in the first days; now the regime has already largely recovered. Escorting ships through the Persian Gulf? That requires planning, preparation, and time to coordinate convoys under fire — and simply put there is no time,” he said.
He added that political timelines may further complicate decision-making in Washington.
“Trump, Hegseth and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Kane, cannot yet explain even to themselves what the conditions of victory are, let alone form a winning strategy,” Maksymov said.
Iran’s reliance on asymmetric warfare reflects a broader military doctrine developed over decades in response to U.S. conventional superiority. By targeting energy infrastructure, shipping lanes, and regional economic stability, Tehran can impose costs that extend beyond the battlefield.