Russian expert defends tanks in drone era debate

A debate among Russian military commentators intensified this week after a widely circulated analytical study by defense researcher Jarold McWilliams prompted public responses from prominent Russian military expert Viktor Murakhovsky regarding the future of armored warfare in Ukraine.

The discussion emerged following renewed attention to McWilliams’ 2025 analytical paper, “The Future of Armored Assault Operations,” which examines how armored offensives must adapt to modern battlefields shaped by drones, precision artillery, and dense defensive networks.

The reaction reflects ongoing reassessment inside Russian military commentary circles as battlefield experience in Ukraine continues to challenge traditional armored doctrine. Analysts increasingly acknowledge that large-scale tank assaults — once central to Soviet and Russian operational concepts — face growing risks under persistent drone surveillance and rapid strike systems.

Murakhovsky’s remarks directly addressed this shift, arguing that recent combat experience shows doctrinal failure rather than technological obsolescence of armored vehicles themselves.

In a published analysis discussing combat operations in Ukraine, Murakhovsky wrote:

“Analysis of combat operations of troops participating in the war in Ukraine shows that traditional armored offensive operations are becoming increasingly vulnerable to cheap, widely used UAVs; precise and rapidly guided artillery; complex mine barriers; dispersed anti-tank groups; as well as contested air superiority. However, declaring armored vehicles ‘dead’ means confusing doctrinal failure with a platform failure. What has become obsolete is not the platform, but the traditional method of its employment.”

He further noted that modern battlefield conditions have reduced armored assaults to very small formations:

“We see tank attacks in numbers of one, less often two, and an entirely incredible case — three vehicles. To attack with a company (10 tanks), a battalion (31 tanks), and especially a regiment (94 tanks) can only be dreamed of.”

According to Murakhovsky, contemporary operations require coordination across multiple domains that rarely function simultaneously in practice, limiting the feasibility of massed armored breakthroughs.

The analyst also compared historical Soviet tank formations with current realities, highlighting structural differences in command composition. He noted that a Soviet tank company of 32 personnel operating T-64 or T-72 tanks included five officers and one warrant officer, while a T-80B company fielded an unusually high concentration of command personnel — five officers and eight warrant officers.

Reflecting on present-day crews, he added: “Looking at the current generation of tankers, one can only wish that they return home alive and healthy.”

Murakhovsky described how tank employment in the Ukraine war has shifted toward survivability-focused tactics: “The tactics of combat vehicle crews within the framework of the special military operation have ceased to resemble previous ones. Commanders rely on the survivability of each individual piece of equipment. Shot – maneuver – withdrawal.”

He continued: “A whole collegium monitors each deployment of a single combat vehicle: drone operators, long-range unmanned aviation specialists, commanders of different command levels. Everything is done so that the tank completes its task and, most importantly, survives.”

McWilliams’ study argues that armored assault operations remain viable only if integrated into a broader system combining unmanned aviation, electronic warfare, engineering preparation, and distributed sensors. The paper states that modern battlefields compress the time between detection and destruction, forcing armies to restructure how armored forces operate rather than abandon them altogether.

The analysis proposes replacing traditional linear breakthroughs with preparation-driven operations supported by persistent unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare coverage, and coordinated air-ground effects designed to disrupt enemy targeting cycles before armored units advance.

The concept described by McWilliams shifts tanks from leading exposed assaults toward operating inside a layered protection system. Unmanned aerial vehicles conduct reconnaissance and strikes ahead of advancing forces, while engineers and robotic systems prepare assault corridors and reduce exposure to mines and ambushes.

This approach seeks to shorten the time armored vehicles remain detectable while expanding the adversary’s decision cycle — a central requirement in drone-saturated environments.

The exchange highlights a wider trend across militaries studying the Ukraine war: armored platforms remain necessary for protected mobility and firepower, but mass formations operating without integrated unmanned and electronic support face higher losses.

Both Western and Russian analysts increasingly describe modern combat as a competition between sensor networks and survivability measures rather than purely armored mass.

Murakhovsky’s comments align with that evolving interpretation, emphasizing adaptation of doctrine rather than abandonment of tanks.

Debates about the relevance of tanks intensified after heavy armored losses reported during early phases of the Russia-Ukraine war, where drones, precision artillery, and layered defenses disrupted large mechanized advances. Since then, both sides have increasingly relied on smaller formations, dispersed maneuver, and extensive drone reconnaissance.

McWilliams’ paper builds on these observations, presenting an academic framework intended for conceptual discussion rather than tactical instruction, according to the author’s stated scope.