The Russian defense plant ‘Micropibor,’ located in Konakovo, Tver Region, is at the center of new concerns over the supply chain for the Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation fighter jet.
According to a recent report by The Telegraph, ongoing production issues at Micropibor stem from a shortage of parts critical for manufacturing the MPPU-50 component, a key element of the aircraft.
Despite the Kremlin’s aggressive push toward self-sufficiency in defense production, documents indicate that Micropibor still relies heavily on Western components. This dependency is seen in both new and older manufacturing equipment, much of which is imported from Germany, Taiwan, and even the United States. A recently uncovered report from early 2022 highlights that nearly half of the machinery at Micropibor, especially newer models, is foreign-made.
Information gathered by the international intelligence collective InformNapalm further reveals that Micropibor continues to receive these components despite sanctions. The equipment is sourced through complex supply networks, including a U.S.-based branch of a Russian company named Planar, which allegedly delivers crucial electronic parts to Micropibor.
The operation to monitor Micropibor has taken two years, aided by the Ukrainian hacking collective ‘Cyber Resistance’ in collaboration with private intelligence firm Dallas. This partnership allowed hackers to infiltrate Micropibor’s internal network, gaining specifications on the weapons produced. While only a small portion of the collected data has been published, the available information paints a detailed picture of how Russia’s defense industry remains deeply connected to Western supply chains.
Documents suggest that despite sanctions and the rhetoric of ‘import substitution,’ Russia continues to struggle to replace foreign equipment. The situation is particularly stark in Micropibor’s mechanical processing section, where the newest machinery is mostly imported, with a relatively minor contribution from ‘friendly’ nations like China.
Recent procurement records show that in 2023, Micropibor purchased German-made spectrum analyzers from Rohde&Schwarz through a company named AMTEST. The company’s website openly advertises its services as providing “equipment from global manufacturers to all regions of Russia,” indicating that supply lines have not been significantly disrupted.
Russia’s attempts to portray itself as technologically independent often clash with the reality on the ground. In one example, a lathe procured by Micropibor from a firm named DM Technologies, which was supposed to be a ‘Russian’ machine, turned out to be equipped with German, Taiwanese, and Chinese components, with payments made in Chinese yuan.
Despite formal sanctions and isolation attempts, parts from German companies like Siemens and Blum-Novotest are found in equipment labeled as Russian. For instance, Blum-Novotest’s sensors, used to minimize human error in production, were recently found in Micropibor’s assembly line. The German company still maintains a visible presence in Russia, with a Russian-language site and a Moscow branch listed on their contact map.
While U.S. sanctions were recently imposed on DM Technologies, no equivalent pressure seems to be directed towards suppliers in China or Taiwan. The current regulatory gaps mean that companies from Germany and Taiwan face no additional scrutiny about where their products end up, and they bear no responsibility for the ultimate military use by Russia.
