Russia’s once-deep reserves of armored vehicles are shrinking rapidly, with new open-source assessments showing dramatic reductions in stored tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery systems since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine.
Yet analysts caution that the data should not be interpreted as evidence that Moscow has run out of equipment altogether.
OSINT specialist Jompy released updated assessments on October 7, using satellite imagery and depot inventories to track the state of Russia’s armored reserves.
Their findings show that Russia’s prewar stockpile of more than 7,300 tanks has fallen to around 2,887 — meaning more than 4,400 tanks have been removed from storage since February 2022. Many of those that remain are in poor condition, with only about 23 percent classified as in decent or usable state.
The data indicates widespread depletion across all categories of armored vehicles. Prewar stocks of T-72B tanks, once the backbone of Russia’s armored forces, have dropped from 1,478 to just 292. T-62 stocks have been cut by nearly half, while T-80 series tanks — including the T-80BV and T-80UD — have fallen from more than 1,450 to roughly 292. Even older models such as the T-54 and T-55, once considered obsolete, have been reactivated and pushed into combat.
The pattern repeats across other vehicle classes. Russia’s inventory of BMP infantry fighting vehicles has declined from more than 7,100 to 2,579, and its stock of BMD airborne vehicles now stands at just 166. Armored personnel carriers have also been heavily drawn down, from over 11,000 before the war to just over 5,000 in 2025. Artillery reserves, too, have thinned out — with large-caliber towed and self-propelled guns reduced by nearly half.
However, analysts stress that the situation is more complex than a simple depletion of numbers. In his assessment, Waffentraeger urged caution in interpreting the data.
“Firstly with enough effort any hull that wasn’t compromised by for example having been burned (which makes steel weak) can be restored,” Waffentraeger said. “There’s evidence of relatively rusted hulls being taken as material for deep modernisations. Even the worst condition tanks could be reactivated to 100%, in theory. This is not economical (a new tank will be cheaper) but still faster than building a new T-90M, usually.”
He noted that it is not possible to determine from satellite imagery alone whether a tank hull is too damaged to repair or when Russian planners decide to scrap one entirely.
“We simply can’t assess if a tank hull has indeed been compromised with satellite footage alone or at what point the Russians will decide to scrap a hull,” Waffentraeger said. “What we can assess is that it will take a lot longer to rebuild a tank in worse condition than one in decent. This will negatively affect the refurbishment rate rather than meaning a complete stop of supply.”
The slowing refurbishment process means that Moscow will need to conserve its remaining armored vehicles more carefully in the future than it did in 2023 and 2024, when there was still a plentiful supply of tanks that could be quickly restored and deployed.
The T-80B/BV series has been entirely exhausted from long-term storage, though there are still sufficient components and partial hulls available to sustain work at refurbishment plants for roughly a year.
The new analysis underscores the dual reality facing Moscow: while the easy reserves are drying up and the condition of remaining equipment is steadily worsening, Russia retains the industrial capacity to refurbish even heavily degraded vehicles — a process that, while slower and less efficient, will likely continue supplying armored units for years to come.
For Western analysts, the message is clear: Russia’s stockpile is shrinking, but it is far from empty. The next phase of the war will likely hinge not just on battlefield attrition but on the speed and scale of Russia’s ability to bring its aging, rusting fleet back to life.