Ukraine discloses how missile units acted in the first days of the Russian invasion

For the anniversary of its formation, the Ukrainian 19th Missile Brigade “Saint Barbara” has disclosed details of its operations during the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Commanders and participants described how the brigade used Soviet-era Tochka-U missile systems to strike key Russian targets at a time when Ukraine lacked long-range precision weapons.

In February 2022, Russia announced what it called “military exercises,” which then transitioned into a large-scale invasion across multiple axes. At that time, Ukraine had limited long-range strike capabilities. Artillery could reach about 40 kilometers, rocket artillery up to 70 kilometers but with area effects, Neptune missiles existed only in a surface-to-ship configuration, and S-300 systems were intended for air defense rather than accurate ground targeting. Tochka-U remained the longest-range and most precise battlefield missile available, with a maximum range of 120 kilometers and a warhead weighing 482 kilograms.

The Tochka-U system consists of a command vehicle, a single-missile launcher, and a loader-transport vehicle that carries two more missiles and a crane. The brigade had been equipped entirely with Tochka-U since 2007, and by 2022 was the only missile brigade of its type in Ukrainian service.

According to the account, command elements issued orders nearly a week before the invasion to redeploy several units to concentration areas. These deployments were made under instructions that outlined actions to be taken if Russia attacked from any direction. When the invasion began, some units were already positioned for operations, while others moved to assigned sectors. A composite detachment was formed at the brigade’s main base to help defend Kyiv. The brigade also executed a deliberate feint: forming convoys and visibly driving east before quietly returning to conceal their actual disposition.

The brigade dispersed across multiple regions, taking responsibility for wide operational areas and shifting directions to avoid detection. Every day, crews fired multiple Tochka-U missiles at supply points, staging areas and concentrations of forces beyond the frontline. The report states that Russian forces initially did not understand where the strikes were coming from.

In the northern theater, a unit positioned in forested terrain in Chernihiv region found itself between two advancing Russian routes. Surrounded, the missile crew struck both supply lines ahead and columns that had passed behind them, as well as targets near Kyiv and within the Chernobyl exclusion zone. Drivers delivering missiles maneuvered through backroads under threat. Russian aircraft later attempted to bomb the area, but according to the brigade’s account, no personnel or vehicles were lost, with one bomb falling roughly 150 meters from their positions.

In the east, a unit moved quickly toward Siversk to strike Millerovo Air Base in Russia. The missile attack on February 25 destroyed aircraft and personnel. Another strike used cluster-warhead Tochka-U missiles on a large Russian convoy halted at a road junction between Luhansk and Donetsk regions, destroying numerous armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles.

In the southeast, a unit near Volnovakha was unable to receive fire orders due to lost communications. The crew improvised a communication link and successfully launched missiles at Taganrog Air Base, destroying one Il-76 aircraft on the runway and damaging another.

In the south, Russian forces advanced from occupied Crimea toward the South Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant. Due to minimum firing distances, the missile crews repeatedly repositioned: loading, firing, withdrawing and returning. Russian advances were stopped near Voznesensk in Mykolaiv region.

As the pace of operations increased, missile stocks began to run low. The report states that engineers used factory-stored rocket bodies and replaced warheads with charges adapted from high-explosive aerial bombs. This improvised production effort enabled continued strikes within weeks.

The brigade’s Tochka-U systems were used in strikes on Chornobaivka, Snake Island, Russian airfields, depots, logistics routes, and during the defense of Kherson and Kharkiv. The account credits the brigade with contributing to the sinking of the landing ship Saratov and other high-value targets.

Ukraine relied on legacy missile systems to prevent rapid Russian breakthroughs before Western long-range systems were supplied. The account illustrates the importance of mobility, deception and improvisation in early defensive operations. It also shows how pre-existing stocks and rapid field adaptation enabled Ukraine to sustain strikes across multiple fronts at a critical moment when the outcome of the war was still uncertain.