- Lt. Gen. Tabor told Congress May 13, 2026, that Barksdale Air Force Base drone defenses are insufficient for future threats.
- The Air Force is still developing what adequate counter-drone protection for domestic bases would require, Tabor testified.
A senior U.S. Air Force general acknowledged before Congress that the military lacks adequate defenses to protect its own air bases from drone incursions on American soil, and that the service is still working out what it would even take to fix the problem.
Lt. Gen. David Tabor, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, made the admission during a May 13, 2026, hearing of the House Armed Services Committee’s Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, in response to pointed questioning from Rep. Clay Higgins of Louisiana about a drone intrusion over Barksdale Air Force Base.
Barksdale, located outside Bossier City, Louisiana, is not a peripheral installation. It is the home of Air Force Global Strike Command’s Eighth Air Force, the headquarters overseeing the service’s entire bomber fleet including the B-52 Stratofortress and the new B-21 Raider. Drones penetrating airspace above that base are not a nuisance problem. They are a potential intelligence, surveillance, and sabotage threat to some of the most sensitive military infrastructure the United States operates.
Higgins pressed Tabor on whether the Air Force understood what happened during the incursion, whether the response was adequate, and critically, what it would cost and require to prevent it from happening again. Tabor’s answers were notable for their candor. “I’m satisfied with the way they’ve responded, given the resources that they have,” he told the subcommittee. “I do not think that the resources that they have are sufficient for the future threats that we anticipate.”
On the central question of what it would actually take to secure the airspace above Barksdale and installations like it, Tabor was direct about the limits of current knowledge. “We’re still in the process of developing that,” he said. “We have our program of record, which I’ve stated I don’t think was sufficient, certainly not in the case that we saw at Barksdale, and we’re trying to develop other capabilities through GAA 401 that gives us a little bit more efficacy in a stateside scenario.”
GAA 401 refers to authorities under Section 401 of counter-drone legislation that grants the Department of War certain detection and mitigation capabilities on military installations inside the United States, authorities that are more restricted on domestic soil than they would be in a combat theater. The distinction matters enormously when it comes to the most straightforward solution.
“It would be nice to be able to have a kinetic capability,” Tabor told the committee, “but there are obvious policy problems, but we’re kind of working through that and looking at other options that perhaps are less kinetic.”
That exchange captures the central tension the U.S. military faces when defending its own bases from small unmanned aircraft systems inside American borders. Shooting down a drone over a Louisiana air base is legally and politically a fundamentally different proposition from shooting one down over Syria or Iraq. Rules of engagement, airspace authority, liability for falling debris, and federal aviation regulations all constrain what a base commander can order, regardless of what the threat picture looks like on radar. The result, as Tabor effectively acknowledged, is that the world’s most powerful air force is still working out how to legally and practically stop a consumer-grade drone from flying over the aircraft that underpin its nuclear deterrent.
The Barksdale incursion is not an isolated episode. Drone sightings over sensitive U.S. military installations have become a recurring security concern in recent years, with reported incidents at multiple bases raising questions about whether adversary intelligence services are using commercially available platforms for reconnaissance or to probe defensive gaps. The nature of the Barksdale incident, including what the drones were, where they came from, and what if anything they observed or transmitted, has not been fully disclosed publicly. Higgins noted during the hearing that he had been unable to obtain a clear answer on exactly what investment was needed to address the threat.
“We don’t really know,” he said. “We’re not certain.”
Gaps in military capability are a permanent condition that any honest defense budget hearing will surface. What is significant is that the gap in question sits directly above one of the most strategically important pieces of real estate in the American military enterprise, that the general responsible for Air Force programs acknowledged the existing program of record is insufficient, and that the service is still at the stage of developing what an adequate solution would look like rather than fielding one.
The Air Force is pursuing less kinetic options, Tabor indicated, without specifying what those might be. Electronic jamming, directed energy systems, and net-based capture systems have all been discussed in the broader counter-drone policy debate, each carrying its own technical limitations, cost profile, and legal considerations when employed domestically. None of them has emerged as a settled programmatic answer for base defense inside the United States.
Higgins closed his line of questioning by saying he hoped to revisit the subject in a setting with more time. Given what Tabor put on the record, that conversation cannot come soon enough. A drone over Barksdale today is an embarrassment and a warning. What it becomes tomorrow depends entirely on whether the Air Force can move from developing an answer to fielding one before someone with worse intentions than a curious hobbyist decides to find out exactly how undefended that airspace really is.