Writing in The Strategist, defense analyst Ross Babbage argues that Australia must urgently develop independent, long-range strike capabilities to prepare for an era of heightened strategic uncertainty.
He contends that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) cannot rely solely on U.S. guarantees and should pursue “very strong independent deterrence,” even against a major power adversary.
Babbage outlined the need for a select range of capabilities that would be difficult for any opponent to counter, affordable at scale, and domestically produced. Among his central recommendations is the introduction of a road-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic missile with ranges of 3,000 to 5,500 kilometers. He describes these systems as highly survivable, fast, and versatile, with the ability to strike land or sea targets within minutes.
“Road-mobile ballistic missiles would be a great choice,” Babbage wrote. “They’re hard to intercept, they strike over thousands of kilometres in just tens of minutes, they can attack land or sea targets without risking friendly lives, and they’re hard to find before launch if paired with decoys, camouflage and concealment.”
He recalled the challenges faced by U.S. and allied forces in hunting down Iraqi Scud missile launchers during the 1991 Gulf War as evidence of their effectiveness in complicating an adversary’s operations.
Babbage stressed that while such weapons would not alone provide a complete deterrent, their deployment would raise the cost of aggression for any adversary and force them to think twice before contemplating an attack. He argued that the missiles must be long-range, equipped with onboard sensors to operate without satellite guidance, and carry penetration aids such as decoys and electronic countermeasures. Ideally, each missile would be fitted with multiple independently targetable warheads to maximize impact.
He added that the launchers would require encrypted links to Australian battle networks for targeting and fire orders, while camouflage and concealment would be critical to survivability.
Babbage proposed a three-step pathway. The first step would involve selecting a partner nation with existing ballistic missile capabilities, one that is allied or at least friendly, and free from close ties to China, Russia, or Iran. The second step would be to acquire a stopgap capability by purchasing missiles, mobile launchers, spares, and limited modifications to integrate them with ADF systems. The third step would involve developing a joint program with the partner, pooling expertise and resources to produce longer-range and more survivable missiles.
In considering potential partners, Babbage pointed to Israel and South Korea as leading candidates. Israel’s Jericho 3 ballistic missile has a range of 4,800 to 6,500 kilometers, while South Korea’s Hyunmoo 5 can strike targets up to 5,000 kilometers away. Both nations also manufacture their own sensors, warheads, and missile defense systems, giving them a detailed understanding of the technical requirements for ensuring penetration against advanced defenses.
“Israel and South Korea have advantages over other potential contenders,” he wrote, highlighting their indigenous missile programs and self-sufficiency in critical technologies.
He noted that South Korea is a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal arrangement designed to prevent the spread of long-range missile technology. While not legally binding, membership could complicate cooperation. Israel, not a member of the MTCR, could serve as an alternative partner should Seoul be unwilling to provide missiles or technology transfer.
The urgency behind Babbage’s proposal lies in uncertainty about the U.S. role in future crises.
“We cannot now exclude the possibility that in a future crisis the US may choose to stand aloof or put conditions on its support that undermine our sovereignty,” he warned.
For that reason, he argued, Australia must place a high priority on developing independent strike systems that could decisively alter an adversary’s strategic calculations. By raising the risks and costs of military action, such a capability would strengthen deterrence and protect national sovereignty in a volatile Indo-Pacific environment.