In the wake of Ukraine’s successful strikes on the Russian Black Sea Fleet using low-cost, agile unmanned surface vessels (USVs), the global defense community has shifted focus to a domain once considered niche.
Yet, long before Kyiv’s sea drones earned battlefield credibility, a little-known American platform had already proven its potential — and was quietly buried.
Howard Hornsby, now in his seventies, was behind the OWL MK II — a modular unmanned surface vehicle developed in the late 1980s and tested extensively in the 1990s. Despite its early technical maturity, the OWL project faced institutional resistance from the U.S. Department of Defense.
Developed beginning in 1984 under the name International Robotic Systems, the unmanned surface vessel program later operated as Navtec Inc. starting in 1995. In 2004, the OWL platform was transferred to Universal Secure Applications, LLC, a woman-owned company led by Howard Hornsby’s wife, Karen, as CEO. All development was privately funded from the start, with the earliest OWL prototypes featuring modular architecture, autonomous control, and real-time ISR capability.
From 1995 to 1997, the OWL MK II operated under U.S. Navy DET 1 in Bahrain, conducting harbor protection, minehunting, littoral anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and covert surveillance. It integrated easily with existing naval vessels and could be deployed by air, launched from small ships, or air-dropped. During FBE-Juliet 1997, a fleet battle experiment off San Diego, it demonstrated its capacity to outperform much larger and costlier systems in real-world conditions.
But success came at a cost. “We were told it was too advanced and low cost,” Hornsby said. “Upsetting a lot of high-dollar funded DOD programs and rice bowls.” A planned order for 15 units by NSWC/ONR — intended for deployment on U.S. Navy ships in the Gulf — was canceled just before the USS Cole attack. Hornsby was told the Department of Defense could not “give the impression publicly that we had any threats in the area.”
Eventually, the project ran out of support. “Our company had to close down operations for USVs in the early 2000s,” he said. Despite winning more than 41 contracts with the Office of Special Technology (OST) in the 1990s, the program never became a formal line item. “There was no ORD for it… OST wasn’t allowed to market or endorse any of the products. Very strange!” Hornsby added.
The OWL MK II wasn’t a one-off platform. It was modular and scalable — ranging from 3 to over 11 meters. Later variants reached speeds over 70 knots, carried up to 1,450 lbs of payload, and operated more than 36 hours at sea, even in rough conditions.
The control systems, branded NEURALTRONIC, were JAUS-interoperable, enabling rapid integration with common sensor types and other naval platforms.
The OWL fleet executed various mission sets: ISR, mine countermeasures (MCM), special operations, littoral surveillance, and ASW. It tracked submarines in shallow water, performed minehunting in the Arabian Gulf, and conducted 24/7 harbor protection in Bahrain.
“We completed the in-shore and surf zone mine clearing through kelp beds when others could not,” Hornsby said.
Most of this work was carried out without GPS. “No GPS, swarm capabilities, over-the-horizon missions… complete stealth capabilities, undetectable during ops,” Hornsby said. It was field-tested in storms, sand-laced fog in the Gulf, and under conditions that many of today’s prototypes still avoid.
As Hornsby tells it, the OWL was ultimately a casualty of Washington’s political dynamics. “I was told to stop. I was compromising too many rice bowls,” he said, referring to entrenched defense programs that saw OWL as a threat. Without support from any single military branch and blocked from becoming a Program of Record, the OWL was cut off from funding and denied formal recognition.
“There was no congressional support. The biggest problem was the political wall,” Hornsby said. “When they [DOD] are ready, out go the solicitations… using your technology and lessons learned.”
The frustrations extended to intellectual property. Hornsby accused NUWC Rhode Island of stealing OWL-related designs and presenting them as original in 2002. “They built a RIB USV and said their vehicle was the first and only system out there. What a lie,” he said. Fortunately, other field operators exposed the act.
Despite attempts to revive the platform and offer insights to current U.S. Navy efforts — including outreach to PMS 406 — Hornsby says no one has responded.
“I see everything from 30 to 40 years ago just now coming about. Very sad,” he said.
He warned that today’s push to mass-produce USVs may again be repeating past mistakes.
“Everything is being tested in calm seas… What happens in 20-foot waves, rain, fog, floating debris?” he asked. The OWL platform was designed with survivability, modularity, and rapid deployment in mind. “No ship’s captain will go for it if setup takes days. You might have an hour to get on board or no go. I’ve been there,” he added.
Even the sensors, Hornsby noted, are often too large. “Most naval systems’ sensors were built for ships and aircraft. We repackaged and purpose-built them to fit the platform size,” he said.
Today, as dozens of startups and legacy firms race to supply sea drones for navies worldwide, OWL’s legacy remains largely unacknowledged. Yet the platform’s history provides a template — and a warning.
“The industry still doesn’t know all the hidden gottchas,” Hornsby said. “With the right funding, we could rapidly be there again.” For now, his pioneering work remains an overlooked chapter in unmanned maritime warfare — a story of what could have been if innovation had found institutional support instead of closed doors.