- The 11th Airborne Division at JBER runs counter-drone training using commercial drones with dropping mechanisms, simulating FPV attacks with tennis balls per training developer Donovan Fredericksen.
- JBER's 673d Security Forces Squadron uses the Dronebuster jammer and the NINJA detect-and-defeat system to protect the installation, with all security forces specialists receiving C-sUAS training.
The U.S. Army’s 11th Airborne Division at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson in Alaska is training soldiers to detect, evade, and counter small drones using commercial off-the-shelf aircraft loaded with tennis balls to simulate explosive drops.
Donovan Fredericksen, a training developer and integrator with U.S. Army Pacific’s G3 Home Station Training Team supporting the 11th Airborne Division, described the shift in his team’s focus and the surge in demand it has produced.
“Since the Secretary of War’s drone-dominance memo, we’ve seen exponential growth in the interest and enthusiasm for drone training,” Fredericksen said. “Recently, the units on base have really been beating down our doors for this training.” His team, staffed by civilian contractors operating JBER’s home-station training program, spent years focused on improvised explosive device threats before the mass FPV drone attacks in Ukraine and elsewhere redirected the entire training architecture toward small unmanned aerial systems.
The training methodology Fredericksen’s team runs reflects the operational reality that Ukrainian soldiers have documented at enormous cost: FPV drones are difficult to hear under fire, they move fast, and a single missed detection can be lethal. His team flies commercial drones equipped with dropping mechanisms loaded with tennis balls against units in the field, forcing soldiers to practice detection and reaction under conditions that approximate combat without the live ordnance.
“We use commercial off-the-shelf drones against units to get [the Soldiers] used to seeing the platforms and reacting to contact,” Fredericksen said. “It can be difficult to hear a drone with live fire and ear protection on, but it’s important they understand the consequences of failing to detect a drone.” All training drones carry cameras, and footage is reviewed by units after exercises so soldiers can evaluate both their detection performance and the effectiveness of their concealment techniques.
Camouflage, it turns out, has become more complicated than it used to be. Fredericksen addressed the evolving challenge directly. “Camouflage can be a really effective way to avoid a drone attack,” he said. “But it’s tricky as technology becomes more accessible. There are cheap infrared camera attachments available now, so it’s not just about what can be seen with the naked eye.” The availability of affordable thermal attachments for commercial drones means that techniques effective against daylight optical cameras may fail against infrared sensors that detect body heat signatures regardless of visual concealment, forcing soldiers to think about their thermal signature as well as their visible profile.
The 11th Airborne Division has invested in an innovation lab at JBER to support the drone training program, equipping it with 3D printers capable of fabricating drone components and purpose-built platforms at a fraction of commercial drone costs. That manufacturing capacity is opening the door for offensive training that goes beyond counter-drone techniques. Fredericksen confirmed plans already in place to train soldiers on flying first-person view drones for one-way attack missions. The transition from purely defensive to offensive drone training reflects how comprehensively the FPV drone has reshaped what the Army expects its soldiers to know and do.
The base defense dimension of JBER’s drone programs runs through a different organization: the 673d Security Forces Squadron of the U.S. Air Force, which is responsible for protecting the installation itself. U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant Taylor Davis, the 673d SFS counter-sUAS noncommissioned officer in charge, described a layered defense architecture that combines technology with trained human sensors. “All of our security forces specialists receive C-sUAS training,” Davis said. “In addition to fundamental instruction and using the Dronebuster, some of our specialists also complete a phase two training process to operate our drone sensor system.” The Dronebuster, a handheld radio frequency jammer produced by Domo Tactical Communications, is one of the more widely fielded counter-drone tools in U.S. military and security force inventories, capable of disrupting the control links and GPS navigation of commercial drones without requiring a line-of-sight shot.
For more sophisticated threats, JBER employs the Air Force’s Negation of Improvised Non-State Joint Aerial system, known as NINJA. Davis described the NINJA system as a detect-and-defeat capability that allows security forces to identify and take control of unauthorized drones, after which the drone can be landed and traced back to its operator. That operator-location capability transforms the NINJA from a purely defensive tool into an investigative one, enabling security forces to identify the source of unauthorized drone activity rather than simply ending it.
The threat profile that base security forces must manage is broader than simple hostile intent. High-quality cameras on commercially available drones can photograph sensitive areas of an installation at altitudes and distances that prevent any visible intrusion. Dropping mechanisms can deliver payloads. Even an unauthorized drone with no hostile intent poses an airspace hazard to manned aircraft operating from the base. U.S. Air Force Tech. Sergeant Matthew Burt, NCOIC of small UAS operations at JBER, oversees all drone activity on the installation and holds both a master’s degree in sUAS operations and an adjunct professorship at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Florida. His perspective on the technology’s future was optimistic rather than defensive. “Drones can do a lot of amazing things, but people are either afraid to use them or don’t know about the technology that’s out there,” Burt said.
Authorized drone operations at JBER already include explosive ordnance disposal and rapid airfield assessment by the 673d Civil Engineering Group and the 673d SFS, with Burt actively encouraging units with drone ideas to come through his office for regulatory guidance. The rules governing military drone operations change frequently enough that navigating them independently is a genuine barrier to adoption, and Burt’s office functions as the institutional on-ramp for units that want to use the technology but cannot cut through the regulatory complexity alone.
Tennis balls falling from commercial drones onto soldiers practicing evasion in Alaskan terrain is an unusual image of military training. It is also, in 2026, exactly the right one. The Army at JBER is not waiting for the next war to teach its soldiers what Ukraine already demonstrated at enormous cost.